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odysseus/src/mcp_manager.py

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2026-05-31 23:58:26 +09:00
"""
mcp_manager.py
Manages connections to MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool servers.
Each server exposes tools that are made available to the agent loop.
"""
import json
import logging
import os
import re
feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent (#638) * feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent Adds a plan mode: the agent investigates read-only, proposes a checklist, and waits for approval before changing anything. On approval it runs with full tools and checks items off as it goes. Enforcement reuses the existing disabled_tools gate. Includes a slash command: `/plan [on|off]` (and `/toggle plan`) to flip the plan toggle from the chat input. - src/tool_security.py, src/mcp_manager.py: read-only allowlist (tools + MCP). - src/agent_loop.py, routes/chat_routes.py: union the disabled set, prepend the plan directive, force agent mode. - static/: plan toggle pill, Approve & Run, dockable plan window, task-list checkboxes, and the /plan slash command. - tests/test_plan_mode.py. * Plan mode: persistent re-referenceable plan + agent write-back Three improvements so a long plan survives a weak model and stays in reach: 1. Re-reference the plan (out-of-context fix). On the execution turn the frontend sends the approved checklist back (`approved_plan`); the backend pins it as a top-of-context `## ACTIVE PLAN` system note (kept by the context trimmer), so the agent can always re-read the plan instead of losing the thread on a long run. New `build_active_plan_note()` (unit-tested). 2. Re-open / dock the plan anytime. The plan checklist is stored per-session (localStorage). When a plan exists, the plan-mode button opens a small menu ("Show plan" / "Plan mode: On/Off") that re-opens the side-dockable plan window — so it can stay docked while the agent works. The window live-refreshes as the plan changes. 3. Agent write-back: new `update_plan` tool. The agent calls it to tick steps `- [x]` after finishing them, or to revise steps when the user asks. Marker tool (no I/O) → `plan_update` SSE event → the stored plan + docked window update live. The ACTIVE PLAN note instructs the agent to use it. Backend: src/agent_loop.py (param + pin + note builder + emit + prompt blurb), src/tool_execution.py (update_plan handler), routes/chat_routes.py (parse `approved_plan`, relay `plan_update`), registration in tool_schemas / agent_tools / tool_index (always-available, not admin-gated). Frontend: static/js/chat.js (plan store, send `approved_plan`, handle `plan_update`, capture restated checklists), static/app.js (plan-button menu), static/js/planWindow.js (`isPlanWindowOpen`), static/js/storage.js (PLAN key). Tests: tests/test_plan_mode.py (plan-note), tests/test_update_plan_tool.py. * Plan mode: drop bash/python, rely on read-only discovery tools Shell can mutate (write files, hit the network) and can't be constrained to read-only at the tool layer, so plan mode no longer relies on a prompt to keep it well-behaved — bash/python are removed from the read-only allowlist and added to the fail-closed block set. Discovery is covered by the dedicated read-only tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) instead. Rewrites the plan-mode directive to state shell is disabled and lists the available read-only tools positively. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Comment: note _MCP_READONLY_VERBS are prefixes not whole words Clarifies that entries like "summar" are intentional stems matched via startswith (covers summarise/summarize/summary), not typos. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: clarify why gating inverts the allowlist into a denylist Rename _PLAN_MODE_FALLBACK_BLOCK -> _PLAN_MODE_KNOWN_MUTATORS and rewrite the comments. The tool gate is a denylist (disabled_tools); plan mode's policy is an allowlist, so it returns the inverse (all known tool names minus the allowlist). The static mutator set is a backstop for the schema-derived name list, which misses XML-only tools and can fail to import. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: stop hardcoding the read-only tool list in the directive The model is already shown its available (read-only) tools by _assemble_prompt, which removes every disabled tool. Enumerating them again in the directive only duplicated that list and would drift as tools change. Point at the tools listed below instead. Addresses review feedback on #638.
2026-06-05 16:32:25 +02:00
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple
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from src.runtime_paths import get_app_root
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _format_mcp_connection_error(name: str, command: str = "", args: Optional[List[str]] = None, error: Exception = None) -> str:
"""Return a user-actionable MCP connection error message."""
args = args or []
raw_error = str(error) if error else "Unknown error"
command_line = " ".join([command or "", *args]).strip()
lower_command = command_line.lower()
if "@playwright/mcp" in lower_command:
return (
f"{raw_error}\n\n"
"Browser MCP could not start. On fresh installs, cache the Playwright MCP package once before connecting:\n\n"
"npx -y @playwright/mcp@latest --version\n\n"
"Then restart Odysseus and reconnect the Browser MCP server."
)
return raw_error
# Caps for rendering untrusted MCP tool schemas into the agent prompt (issue #2660).
# MCP servers are third-party/user-added, so field names and parameter counts are
# untrusted input — bound them so an odd or hostile schema cannot distort the prompt.
_MCP_PARAM_MAX = 12 # max params rendered per tool
_MCP_TOKEN_MAX = 40 # max chars per rendered name / type token
_MCP_HINT_MAX = 300 # total-length backstop for the whole hint
def _sanitize_schema_token(value: Any, limit: int = _MCP_TOKEN_MAX) -> str:
"""Make an untrusted JSON-Schema token safe to splice into the prompt.
Replaces control chars / newlines with a space, collapses whitespace, and
length-caps the result, so a weird field name or type cannot inject newlines
or run on. Normal short identifiers pass through unchanged.
"""
text = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]+", " ", str(value))
text = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", text).strip()
if len(text) > limit:
text = text[:limit].rstrip() + "…"
return text
def _format_mcp_params(input_schema: Any) -> str:
"""Render an MCP tool's JSON-Schema inputs as a compact prompt hint.
Without this the agent only sees a tool's name + description and has to
guess its arguments (issue #2509). Produces e.g.
` Args (JSON): {"path": string (required), "limit": integer}` — names,
coarse types, and required-ness, kept short so it stays prompt-friendly.
Returns "" when there are no parameters.
MCP servers are third-party, so names/types are sanitized and the parameter
count + total length are capped (issue #2660); normal schemas are unaffected.
"""
if not isinstance(input_schema, dict):
return ""
props = input_schema.get("properties")
if not isinstance(props, dict) or not props:
return ""
required = set(input_schema.get("required") or [])
parts = []
for pname, pinfo in list(props.items())[:_MCP_PARAM_MAX]:
pinfo = pinfo if isinstance(pinfo, dict) else {}
ptype = pinfo.get("type") or "any"
if isinstance(ptype, list):
ptype = "|".join(str(x) for x in ptype)
tag = f'"{_sanitize_schema_token(pname)}": {_sanitize_schema_token(ptype)}'
if pname in required:
tag += " (required)"
parts.append(tag)
extra = len(props) - len(parts)
if extra > 0:
parts.append(f"…+{extra} more")
hint = " Args (JSON): {" + ", ".join(parts) + "}"
if len(hint) > _MCP_HINT_MAX:
hint = hint[:_MCP_HINT_MAX - 1].rstrip() + "…"
return hint
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feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent (#638) * feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent Adds a plan mode: the agent investigates read-only, proposes a checklist, and waits for approval before changing anything. On approval it runs with full tools and checks items off as it goes. Enforcement reuses the existing disabled_tools gate. Includes a slash command: `/plan [on|off]` (and `/toggle plan`) to flip the plan toggle from the chat input. - src/tool_security.py, src/mcp_manager.py: read-only allowlist (tools + MCP). - src/agent_loop.py, routes/chat_routes.py: union the disabled set, prepend the plan directive, force agent mode. - static/: plan toggle pill, Approve & Run, dockable plan window, task-list checkboxes, and the /plan slash command. - tests/test_plan_mode.py. * Plan mode: persistent re-referenceable plan + agent write-back Three improvements so a long plan survives a weak model and stays in reach: 1. Re-reference the plan (out-of-context fix). On the execution turn the frontend sends the approved checklist back (`approved_plan`); the backend pins it as a top-of-context `## ACTIVE PLAN` system note (kept by the context trimmer), so the agent can always re-read the plan instead of losing the thread on a long run. New `build_active_plan_note()` (unit-tested). 2. Re-open / dock the plan anytime. The plan checklist is stored per-session (localStorage). When a plan exists, the plan-mode button opens a small menu ("Show plan" / "Plan mode: On/Off") that re-opens the side-dockable plan window — so it can stay docked while the agent works. The window live-refreshes as the plan changes. 3. Agent write-back: new `update_plan` tool. The agent calls it to tick steps `- [x]` after finishing them, or to revise steps when the user asks. Marker tool (no I/O) → `plan_update` SSE event → the stored plan + docked window update live. The ACTIVE PLAN note instructs the agent to use it. Backend: src/agent_loop.py (param + pin + note builder + emit + prompt blurb), src/tool_execution.py (update_plan handler), routes/chat_routes.py (parse `approved_plan`, relay `plan_update`), registration in tool_schemas / agent_tools / tool_index (always-available, not admin-gated). Frontend: static/js/chat.js (plan store, send `approved_plan`, handle `plan_update`, capture restated checklists), static/app.js (plan-button menu), static/js/planWindow.js (`isPlanWindowOpen`), static/js/storage.js (PLAN key). Tests: tests/test_plan_mode.py (plan-note), tests/test_update_plan_tool.py. * Plan mode: drop bash/python, rely on read-only discovery tools Shell can mutate (write files, hit the network) and can't be constrained to read-only at the tool layer, so plan mode no longer relies on a prompt to keep it well-behaved — bash/python are removed from the read-only allowlist and added to the fail-closed block set. Discovery is covered by the dedicated read-only tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) instead. Rewrites the plan-mode directive to state shell is disabled and lists the available read-only tools positively. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Comment: note _MCP_READONLY_VERBS are prefixes not whole words Clarifies that entries like "summar" are intentional stems matched via startswith (covers summarise/summarize/summary), not typos. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: clarify why gating inverts the allowlist into a denylist Rename _PLAN_MODE_FALLBACK_BLOCK -> _PLAN_MODE_KNOWN_MUTATORS and rewrite the comments. The tool gate is a denylist (disabled_tools); plan mode's policy is an allowlist, so it returns the inverse (all known tool names minus the allowlist). The static mutator set is a backstop for the schema-derived name list, which misses XML-only tools and can fail to import. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: stop hardcoding the read-only tool list in the directive The model is already shown its available (read-only) tools by _assemble_prompt, which removes every disabled tool. Enumerating them again in the directive only duplicated that list and would drift as tools change. Point at the tools listed below instead. Addresses review feedback on #638.
2026-06-05 16:32:25 +02:00
# Tool-name prefixes that denote a read-only/inspection operation. Used to
# classify MCP tools for plan mode when the server provides no readOnlyHint.
# These are PREFIXES, not whole words (matched via str.startswith below), so a
# stem like "summar" intentionally covers "summarise"/"summarize"/"summary".
_MCP_READONLY_VERBS = (
"list", "get", "read", "search", "fetch", "query", "find", "describe",
"show", "view", "lookup", "count", "status", "info", "inspect", "summar",
)
def mcp_tool_is_readonly(tool: Dict) -> bool:
"""Classify an MCP tool as safe (non-mutating) for plan mode.
Prefer the server's own annotations (readOnlyHint / destructiveHint). When
absent, fall back to a tool-name verb heuristic, and FAIL CLOSED (treat as
write) for anything that doesn't clearly read — plan mode must not run a
write tool just because its intent is ambiguous.
"""
ann = tool.get("annotations")
# annotations may be a dict or a pydantic model
read_hint = None
destructive = None
if ann is not None:
if isinstance(ann, dict):
read_hint = ann.get("readOnlyHint")
destructive = ann.get("destructiveHint")
else:
read_hint = getattr(ann, "readOnlyHint", None)
destructive = getattr(ann, "destructiveHint", None)
if read_hint is True:
return True
if read_hint is False or destructive is True:
return False
# No usable hint — heuristic on the tool name's leading verb.
name = (tool.get("name") or "").lower()
return name.startswith(_MCP_READONLY_VERBS)
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class McpManager:
"""Manages MCP server connections and tool routing."""
def __init__(self):
# server_id -> connection state
self._connections: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
# server_id -> list of tool schemas
self._tools: Dict[str, List[Dict]] = {}
# server_id -> MCP ClientSession
self._sessions: Dict[str, Any] = {}
# server_id -> exit stack (for cleanup)
self._stacks: Dict[str, Any] = {}
feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 (#1033) * feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 Odysseus could only reach MCP servers over stdio and SSE, so modern remote servers like https://mcp.higgsfield.ai/mcp (Streamable HTTP, gated behind OAuth) could not be connected. Add an `http` transport that connects via the SDK's streamablehttp_client and authenticates with the SDK's OAuthClientProvider: RFC 9728 protected-resource discovery, RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata, Dynamic Client Registration, authorization-code + PKCE, and token refresh. A small bridge (src/mcp_oauth.py) connects the SDK's blocking callback to the existing web callback route via an asyncio.Future keyed by the OAuth `state`, and the dynamic client registration plus tokens persist per-server in a new encrypted `oauth_tokens` column. The connect runs as a bounded background task so the "Add server" request returns immediately; redirect_handler publishes needs_auth + auth_url to connection state as soon as discovery/DCR completes (which can exceed the bounded wait), and the UI polls until connected. Remote users finish via the existing paste-back flow. The Google OAuth path is left unchanged. - core/database.py: encrypted oauth_tokens column + migration - src/mcp_oauth.py: OAuth provider, DB-backed TokenStorage, state registry - src/mcp_manager.py: http dispatch, background connect, _connect_http - routes/mcp_routes.py: http validation, needs_auth/auth_url, callback bridge - static/js/settings.js: Streamable HTTP option + OAuth flow with polling - tests: 5 new unit tests (transport dispatch, registry, token storage) Verified against the live Higgsfield server: discovery, DCR (client_id issued), loopback redirect accepted, and a PKCE authorization URL with needs_auth status. No regressions (full suite delta is only the 5 added passing tests). * fix(mcp): address PR #1033 review feedback - mcp_oauth: derive redirect URI from OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL/APP_PUBLIC_URL (default http://localhost:7000) instead of hardcoding the port - mcp_oauth: leave OAuth scope unset so the SDK derives it from the server's WWW-Authenticate/protected-resource metadata; hardcoding an OIDC scope broke non-OpenID MCP servers (verified: Higgsfield still gets its server-derived scope) - mcp_oauth: prune abandoned OAuth flows (_prune_stale + _pending_ts) so the module-level registries can't grow unbounded - mcp_oauth: persist tokens/client-info in a single DB session/commit (_update) instead of a load+save double round-trip - mcp_manager: cancel and drop the background connect task in disconnect_server so a deleted server stops publishing status - database: document why the oauth_tokens migration uses TEXT while the model declares EncryptedText (encryption is applied at the Python layer) - settings.js: surface persistent OAuth-poll failures and an explicit timeout message instead of silently swallowing errors - tests: cover the stale-flow pruning * static/js/settings.js now shows an in-flight loading state on the buttons that fire requests:
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# server_id -> background connect task (HTTP transport / OAuth)
self._connect_tasks: Dict[str, Any] = {}
# Tracking updates to tools/connections for RAG indexing / prompt cache
self._generation = 0
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async def connect_server(
self,
server_id: str,
name: str,
transport: str,
command: Optional[str] = None,
args: Optional[List[str]] = None,
env: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
url: Optional[str] = None,
) -> bool:
feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 (#1033) * feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 Odysseus could only reach MCP servers over stdio and SSE, so modern remote servers like https://mcp.higgsfield.ai/mcp (Streamable HTTP, gated behind OAuth) could not be connected. Add an `http` transport that connects via the SDK's streamablehttp_client and authenticates with the SDK's OAuthClientProvider: RFC 9728 protected-resource discovery, RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata, Dynamic Client Registration, authorization-code + PKCE, and token refresh. A small bridge (src/mcp_oauth.py) connects the SDK's blocking callback to the existing web callback route via an asyncio.Future keyed by the OAuth `state`, and the dynamic client registration plus tokens persist per-server in a new encrypted `oauth_tokens` column. The connect runs as a bounded background task so the "Add server" request returns immediately; redirect_handler publishes needs_auth + auth_url to connection state as soon as discovery/DCR completes (which can exceed the bounded wait), and the UI polls until connected. Remote users finish via the existing paste-back flow. The Google OAuth path is left unchanged. - core/database.py: encrypted oauth_tokens column + migration - src/mcp_oauth.py: OAuth provider, DB-backed TokenStorage, state registry - src/mcp_manager.py: http dispatch, background connect, _connect_http - routes/mcp_routes.py: http validation, needs_auth/auth_url, callback bridge - static/js/settings.js: Streamable HTTP option + OAuth flow with polling - tests: 5 new unit tests (transport dispatch, registry, token storage) Verified against the live Higgsfield server: discovery, DCR (client_id issued), loopback redirect accepted, and a PKCE authorization URL with needs_auth status. No regressions (full suite delta is only the 5 added passing tests). * fix(mcp): address PR #1033 review feedback - mcp_oauth: derive redirect URI from OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL/APP_PUBLIC_URL (default http://localhost:7000) instead of hardcoding the port - mcp_oauth: leave OAuth scope unset so the SDK derives it from the server's WWW-Authenticate/protected-resource metadata; hardcoding an OIDC scope broke non-OpenID MCP servers (verified: Higgsfield still gets its server-derived scope) - mcp_oauth: prune abandoned OAuth flows (_prune_stale + _pending_ts) so the module-level registries can't grow unbounded - mcp_oauth: persist tokens/client-info in a single DB session/commit (_update) instead of a load+save double round-trip - mcp_manager: cancel and drop the background connect task in disconnect_server so a deleted server stops publishing status - database: document why the oauth_tokens migration uses TEXT while the model declares EncryptedText (encryption is applied at the Python layer) - settings.js: surface persistent OAuth-poll failures and an explicit timeout message instead of silently swallowing errors - tests: cover the stale-flow pruning * static/js/settings.js now shows an in-flight loading state on the buttons that fire requests:
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"""Connect to an MCP server via stdio, SSE, or Streamable HTTP transport."""
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try:
if transport == "stdio":
res = await self._connect_stdio(server_id, name, command, args or [], env or {})
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elif transport == "sse":
res = await self._connect_sse(server_id, name, url)
feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 (#1033) * feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 Odysseus could only reach MCP servers over stdio and SSE, so modern remote servers like https://mcp.higgsfield.ai/mcp (Streamable HTTP, gated behind OAuth) could not be connected. Add an `http` transport that connects via the SDK's streamablehttp_client and authenticates with the SDK's OAuthClientProvider: RFC 9728 protected-resource discovery, RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata, Dynamic Client Registration, authorization-code + PKCE, and token refresh. A small bridge (src/mcp_oauth.py) connects the SDK's blocking callback to the existing web callback route via an asyncio.Future keyed by the OAuth `state`, and the dynamic client registration plus tokens persist per-server in a new encrypted `oauth_tokens` column. The connect runs as a bounded background task so the "Add server" request returns immediately; redirect_handler publishes needs_auth + auth_url to connection state as soon as discovery/DCR completes (which can exceed the bounded wait), and the UI polls until connected. Remote users finish via the existing paste-back flow. The Google OAuth path is left unchanged. - core/database.py: encrypted oauth_tokens column + migration - src/mcp_oauth.py: OAuth provider, DB-backed TokenStorage, state registry - src/mcp_manager.py: http dispatch, background connect, _connect_http - routes/mcp_routes.py: http validation, needs_auth/auth_url, callback bridge - static/js/settings.js: Streamable HTTP option + OAuth flow with polling - tests: 5 new unit tests (transport dispatch, registry, token storage) Verified against the live Higgsfield server: discovery, DCR (client_id issued), loopback redirect accepted, and a PKCE authorization URL with needs_auth status. No regressions (full suite delta is only the 5 added passing tests). * fix(mcp): address PR #1033 review feedback - mcp_oauth: derive redirect URI from OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL/APP_PUBLIC_URL (default http://localhost:7000) instead of hardcoding the port - mcp_oauth: leave OAuth scope unset so the SDK derives it from the server's WWW-Authenticate/protected-resource metadata; hardcoding an OIDC scope broke non-OpenID MCP servers (verified: Higgsfield still gets its server-derived scope) - mcp_oauth: prune abandoned OAuth flows (_prune_stale + _pending_ts) so the module-level registries can't grow unbounded - mcp_oauth: persist tokens/client-info in a single DB session/commit (_update) instead of a load+save double round-trip - mcp_manager: cancel and drop the background connect task in disconnect_server so a deleted server stops publishing status - database: document why the oauth_tokens migration uses TEXT while the model declares EncryptedText (encryption is applied at the Python layer) - settings.js: surface persistent OAuth-poll failures and an explicit timeout message instead of silently swallowing errors - tests: cover the stale-flow pruning * static/js/settings.js now shows an in-flight loading state on the buttons that fire requests:
2026-06-05 05:40:52 +05:00
elif transport == "http":
res = await self._start_http_connect(server_id, name, url)
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else:
logger.error(f"Unknown MCP transport: {transport}")
res = False
if res:
self._generation += 1
return res
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except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to connect MCP server {name} ({server_id}): {e}")
error_message = _format_mcp_connection_error(name, command or "", args or [], e)
self._connections[server_id] = {"status": "error", "error": error_message, "name": name}
self._generation += 1
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return False
async def _connect_stdio(self, server_id: str, name: str, command: str, args: List[str], env: Dict[str, str]) -> bool:
"""Connect to an MCP server via stdio transport."""
try:
from mcp import ClientSession, StdioServerParameters
from mcp.client.stdio import stdio_client
from contextlib import AsyncExitStack
server_params = StdioServerParameters(
command=command,
args=args,
env={**os.environ, **env} if env else None,
)
stack = AsyncExitStack()
try:
transport = await stack.enter_async_context(stdio_client(server_params))
read_stream, write_stream = transport
session = await stack.enter_async_context(ClientSession(read_stream, write_stream))
await session.initialize()
# Discover tools
tools_result = await session.list_tools()
except Exception:
await stack.aclose()
raise
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tools = []
for tool in tools_result.tools:
tools.append({
"name": tool.name,
"description": tool.description or "",
"input_schema": tool.inputSchema if hasattr(tool, 'inputSchema') else {},
feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent (#638) * feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent Adds a plan mode: the agent investigates read-only, proposes a checklist, and waits for approval before changing anything. On approval it runs with full tools and checks items off as it goes. Enforcement reuses the existing disabled_tools gate. Includes a slash command: `/plan [on|off]` (and `/toggle plan`) to flip the plan toggle from the chat input. - src/tool_security.py, src/mcp_manager.py: read-only allowlist (tools + MCP). - src/agent_loop.py, routes/chat_routes.py: union the disabled set, prepend the plan directive, force agent mode. - static/: plan toggle pill, Approve & Run, dockable plan window, task-list checkboxes, and the /plan slash command. - tests/test_plan_mode.py. * Plan mode: persistent re-referenceable plan + agent write-back Three improvements so a long plan survives a weak model and stays in reach: 1. Re-reference the plan (out-of-context fix). On the execution turn the frontend sends the approved checklist back (`approved_plan`); the backend pins it as a top-of-context `## ACTIVE PLAN` system note (kept by the context trimmer), so the agent can always re-read the plan instead of losing the thread on a long run. New `build_active_plan_note()` (unit-tested). 2. Re-open / dock the plan anytime. The plan checklist is stored per-session (localStorage). When a plan exists, the plan-mode button opens a small menu ("Show plan" / "Plan mode: On/Off") that re-opens the side-dockable plan window — so it can stay docked while the agent works. The window live-refreshes as the plan changes. 3. Agent write-back: new `update_plan` tool. The agent calls it to tick steps `- [x]` after finishing them, or to revise steps when the user asks. Marker tool (no I/O) → `plan_update` SSE event → the stored plan + docked window update live. The ACTIVE PLAN note instructs the agent to use it. Backend: src/agent_loop.py (param + pin + note builder + emit + prompt blurb), src/tool_execution.py (update_plan handler), routes/chat_routes.py (parse `approved_plan`, relay `plan_update`), registration in tool_schemas / agent_tools / tool_index (always-available, not admin-gated). Frontend: static/js/chat.js (plan store, send `approved_plan`, handle `plan_update`, capture restated checklists), static/app.js (plan-button menu), static/js/planWindow.js (`isPlanWindowOpen`), static/js/storage.js (PLAN key). Tests: tests/test_plan_mode.py (plan-note), tests/test_update_plan_tool.py. * Plan mode: drop bash/python, rely on read-only discovery tools Shell can mutate (write files, hit the network) and can't be constrained to read-only at the tool layer, so plan mode no longer relies on a prompt to keep it well-behaved — bash/python are removed from the read-only allowlist and added to the fail-closed block set. Discovery is covered by the dedicated read-only tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) instead. Rewrites the plan-mode directive to state shell is disabled and lists the available read-only tools positively. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Comment: note _MCP_READONLY_VERBS are prefixes not whole words Clarifies that entries like "summar" are intentional stems matched via startswith (covers summarise/summarize/summary), not typos. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: clarify why gating inverts the allowlist into a denylist Rename _PLAN_MODE_FALLBACK_BLOCK -> _PLAN_MODE_KNOWN_MUTATORS and rewrite the comments. The tool gate is a denylist (disabled_tools); plan mode's policy is an allowlist, so it returns the inverse (all known tool names minus the allowlist). The static mutator set is a backstop for the schema-derived name list, which misses XML-only tools and can fail to import. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: stop hardcoding the read-only tool list in the directive The model is already shown its available (read-only) tools by _assemble_prompt, which removes every disabled tool. Enumerating them again in the directive only duplicated that list and would drift as tools change. Point at the tools listed below instead. Addresses review feedback on #638.
2026-06-05 16:32:25 +02:00
# MCP tool annotations (readOnlyHint / destructiveHint) drive
# plan-mode read-only gating. Absent on many servers, so we
# fall back to a name heuristic in mcp_tool_is_readonly().
"annotations": getattr(tool, 'annotations', None),
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})
self._sessions[server_id] = session
self._stacks[server_id] = stack
self._tools[server_id] = tools
# Extract identity hints from env vars (e.g. email address, API name)
# so tool descriptions can distinguish between multiple instances of
# the same MCP server (e.g. two email accounts).
identity_hints = []
for k, v in (env or {}).items():
k_lower = k.lower()
if any(x in k_lower for x in ['email_address', 'account', 'user', 'username']):
identity_hints.append(v)
identity = ", ".join(identity_hints) if identity_hints else ""
self._connections[server_id] = {
"status": "connected",
"name": name,
"transport": "stdio",
"tool_count": len(tools),
"identity": identity,
}
logger.info(f"MCP server connected: {name} ({server_id}) - {len(tools)} tools via stdio")
return True
except ImportError:
logger.warning("MCP package not installed. Install with: pip install mcp")
self._connections[server_id] = {"status": "error", "error": "mcp package not installed", "name": name}
return False
async def _connect_sse(self, server_id: str, name: str, url: str) -> bool:
"""Connect to an MCP server via SSE transport."""
try:
from mcp import ClientSession
from mcp.client.sse import sse_client
from contextlib import AsyncExitStack
stack = AsyncExitStack()
try:
transport = await stack.enter_async_context(sse_client(url))
read_stream, write_stream = transport
session = await stack.enter_async_context(ClientSession(read_stream, write_stream))
await session.initialize()
# Discover tools
tools_result = await session.list_tools()
except Exception:
await stack.aclose()
raise
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tools = []
for tool in tools_result.tools:
tools.append({
"name": tool.name,
"description": tool.description or "",
"input_schema": tool.inputSchema if hasattr(tool, 'inputSchema') else {},
feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent (#638) * feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent Adds a plan mode: the agent investigates read-only, proposes a checklist, and waits for approval before changing anything. On approval it runs with full tools and checks items off as it goes. Enforcement reuses the existing disabled_tools gate. Includes a slash command: `/plan [on|off]` (and `/toggle plan`) to flip the plan toggle from the chat input. - src/tool_security.py, src/mcp_manager.py: read-only allowlist (tools + MCP). - src/agent_loop.py, routes/chat_routes.py: union the disabled set, prepend the plan directive, force agent mode. - static/: plan toggle pill, Approve & Run, dockable plan window, task-list checkboxes, and the /plan slash command. - tests/test_plan_mode.py. * Plan mode: persistent re-referenceable plan + agent write-back Three improvements so a long plan survives a weak model and stays in reach: 1. Re-reference the plan (out-of-context fix). On the execution turn the frontend sends the approved checklist back (`approved_plan`); the backend pins it as a top-of-context `## ACTIVE PLAN` system note (kept by the context trimmer), so the agent can always re-read the plan instead of losing the thread on a long run. New `build_active_plan_note()` (unit-tested). 2. Re-open / dock the plan anytime. The plan checklist is stored per-session (localStorage). When a plan exists, the plan-mode button opens a small menu ("Show plan" / "Plan mode: On/Off") that re-opens the side-dockable plan window — so it can stay docked while the agent works. The window live-refreshes as the plan changes. 3. Agent write-back: new `update_plan` tool. The agent calls it to tick steps `- [x]` after finishing them, or to revise steps when the user asks. Marker tool (no I/O) → `plan_update` SSE event → the stored plan + docked window update live. The ACTIVE PLAN note instructs the agent to use it. Backend: src/agent_loop.py (param + pin + note builder + emit + prompt blurb), src/tool_execution.py (update_plan handler), routes/chat_routes.py (parse `approved_plan`, relay `plan_update`), registration in tool_schemas / agent_tools / tool_index (always-available, not admin-gated). Frontend: static/js/chat.js (plan store, send `approved_plan`, handle `plan_update`, capture restated checklists), static/app.js (plan-button menu), static/js/planWindow.js (`isPlanWindowOpen`), static/js/storage.js (PLAN key). Tests: tests/test_plan_mode.py (plan-note), tests/test_update_plan_tool.py. * Plan mode: drop bash/python, rely on read-only discovery tools Shell can mutate (write files, hit the network) and can't be constrained to read-only at the tool layer, so plan mode no longer relies on a prompt to keep it well-behaved — bash/python are removed from the read-only allowlist and added to the fail-closed block set. Discovery is covered by the dedicated read-only tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) instead. Rewrites the plan-mode directive to state shell is disabled and lists the available read-only tools positively. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Comment: note _MCP_READONLY_VERBS are prefixes not whole words Clarifies that entries like "summar" are intentional stems matched via startswith (covers summarise/summarize/summary), not typos. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: clarify why gating inverts the allowlist into a denylist Rename _PLAN_MODE_FALLBACK_BLOCK -> _PLAN_MODE_KNOWN_MUTATORS and rewrite the comments. The tool gate is a denylist (disabled_tools); plan mode's policy is an allowlist, so it returns the inverse (all known tool names minus the allowlist). The static mutator set is a backstop for the schema-derived name list, which misses XML-only tools and can fail to import. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: stop hardcoding the read-only tool list in the directive The model is already shown its available (read-only) tools by _assemble_prompt, which removes every disabled tool. Enumerating them again in the directive only duplicated that list and would drift as tools change. Point at the tools listed below instead. Addresses review feedback on #638.
2026-06-05 16:32:25 +02:00
# MCP tool annotations (readOnlyHint / destructiveHint) drive
# plan-mode read-only gating. Absent on many servers, so we
# fall back to a name heuristic in mcp_tool_is_readonly().
"annotations": getattr(tool, 'annotations', None),
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})
self._sessions[server_id] = session
self._stacks[server_id] = stack
self._tools[server_id] = tools
self._connections[server_id] = {
"status": "connected",
"name": name,
"transport": "sse",
"tool_count": len(tools),
}
logger.info(f"MCP server connected: {name} ({server_id}) - {len(tools)} tools via SSE")
return True
except ImportError:
logger.warning("MCP package not installed. Install with: pip install mcp")
self._connections[server_id] = {"status": "error", "error": "mcp package not installed", "name": name}
return False
feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 (#1033) * feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 Odysseus could only reach MCP servers over stdio and SSE, so modern remote servers like https://mcp.higgsfield.ai/mcp (Streamable HTTP, gated behind OAuth) could not be connected. Add an `http` transport that connects via the SDK's streamablehttp_client and authenticates with the SDK's OAuthClientProvider: RFC 9728 protected-resource discovery, RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata, Dynamic Client Registration, authorization-code + PKCE, and token refresh. A small bridge (src/mcp_oauth.py) connects the SDK's blocking callback to the existing web callback route via an asyncio.Future keyed by the OAuth `state`, and the dynamic client registration plus tokens persist per-server in a new encrypted `oauth_tokens` column. The connect runs as a bounded background task so the "Add server" request returns immediately; redirect_handler publishes needs_auth + auth_url to connection state as soon as discovery/DCR completes (which can exceed the bounded wait), and the UI polls until connected. Remote users finish via the existing paste-back flow. The Google OAuth path is left unchanged. - core/database.py: encrypted oauth_tokens column + migration - src/mcp_oauth.py: OAuth provider, DB-backed TokenStorage, state registry - src/mcp_manager.py: http dispatch, background connect, _connect_http - routes/mcp_routes.py: http validation, needs_auth/auth_url, callback bridge - static/js/settings.js: Streamable HTTP option + OAuth flow with polling - tests: 5 new unit tests (transport dispatch, registry, token storage) Verified against the live Higgsfield server: discovery, DCR (client_id issued), loopback redirect accepted, and a PKCE authorization URL with needs_auth status. No regressions (full suite delta is only the 5 added passing tests). * fix(mcp): address PR #1033 review feedback - mcp_oauth: derive redirect URI from OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL/APP_PUBLIC_URL (default http://localhost:7000) instead of hardcoding the port - mcp_oauth: leave OAuth scope unset so the SDK derives it from the server's WWW-Authenticate/protected-resource metadata; hardcoding an OIDC scope broke non-OpenID MCP servers (verified: Higgsfield still gets its server-derived scope) - mcp_oauth: prune abandoned OAuth flows (_prune_stale + _pending_ts) so the module-level registries can't grow unbounded - mcp_oauth: persist tokens/client-info in a single DB session/commit (_update) instead of a load+save double round-trip - mcp_manager: cancel and drop the background connect task in disconnect_server so a deleted server stops publishing status - database: document why the oauth_tokens migration uses TEXT while the model declares EncryptedText (encryption is applied at the Python layer) - settings.js: surface persistent OAuth-poll failures and an explicit timeout message instead of silently swallowing errors - tests: cover the stale-flow pruning * static/js/settings.js now shows an in-flight loading state on the buttons that fire requests:
2026-06-05 05:40:52 +05:00
async def _start_http_connect(self, server_id: str, name: str, url: str, wait: float = 8.0) -> bool:
"""Begin a Streamable HTTP connect in the background. Returns within
`wait` seconds: True if it connected (cached-token path), otherwise the
flow is awaiting browser authorization and status becomes 'needs_auth'."""
import asyncio
self._connections[server_id] = {"status": "connecting", "name": name, "transport": "http"}
task = asyncio.create_task(self._connect_http(server_id, name, url))
self._connect_tasks[server_id] = task
done, _ = await asyncio.wait({task}, timeout=wait)
if task in done:
try:
return task.result()
except Exception as e:
self._connections[server_id] = {"status": "error", "error": str(e), "name": name}
return False
# Still running → either awaiting authorization, or discovery/DCR is
# still in flight. If _on_redirect already published needs_auth+auth_url,
# leave it; otherwise mark needs_auth (auth_url filled in once it fires).
from src.mcp_oauth import pop_auth_url
cur = self._connections.get(server_id, {})
if cur.get("status") != "needs_auth":
self._connections[server_id] = {
"status": "needs_auth", "name": name, "transport": "http",
"auth_url": pop_auth_url(server_id),
}
return False
async def _connect_http(self, server_id: str, name: str, url: str) -> bool:
"""Connect to a Streamable HTTP MCP server (with automatic OAuth)."""
try:
from mcp import ClientSession
from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
from contextlib import AsyncExitStack
from src.mcp_oauth import build_provider, clear_auth_url
def _on_redirect(auth_url):
# Publish needs_auth the moment the URL is known, independent of
# how long discovery/DCR took (may exceed the bounded start wait).
self._connections[server_id] = {
"status": "needs_auth", "name": name, "transport": "http",
"auth_url": auth_url,
}
provider = build_provider(server_id, url, on_redirect=_on_redirect)
stack = AsyncExitStack()
transport = await stack.enter_async_context(streamablehttp_client(url, auth=provider))
read_stream, write_stream, _get_session_id = transport
session = await stack.enter_async_context(ClientSession(read_stream, write_stream))
await session.initialize()
tools_result = await session.list_tools()
tools = []
for tool in tools_result.tools:
tools.append({
"name": tool.name,
"description": tool.description or "",
"input_schema": tool.inputSchema if hasattr(tool, "inputSchema") else {},
})
self._sessions[server_id] = session
self._stacks[server_id] = stack
self._tools[server_id] = tools
self._connections[server_id] = {
"status": "connected", "name": name, "transport": "http",
"tool_count": len(tools),
}
clear_auth_url(server_id)
# Tools changed (this can complete after connect_server already
# returned, via the background OAuth flow), so bump the generation
# to invalidate the tool-prompt cache.
self._generation += 1
logger.info(f"MCP server connected: {name} ({server_id}) - {len(tools)} tools via http")
return True
except ImportError:
logger.warning("MCP package not installed. Install with: pip install mcp")
self._connections[server_id] = {"status": "error", "error": "mcp package not installed", "name": name}
return False
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to connect HTTP MCP server {name} ({server_id}): {e}")
self._connections[server_id] = {"status": "error", "error": str(e), "name": name}
return False
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async def disconnect_server(self, server_id: str):
"""Disconnect from an MCP server."""
feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 (#1033) * feat(mcp): add Streamable HTTP transport with OAuth 2.0 Odysseus could only reach MCP servers over stdio and SSE, so modern remote servers like https://mcp.higgsfield.ai/mcp (Streamable HTTP, gated behind OAuth) could not be connected. Add an `http` transport that connects via the SDK's streamablehttp_client and authenticates with the SDK's OAuthClientProvider: RFC 9728 protected-resource discovery, RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata, Dynamic Client Registration, authorization-code + PKCE, and token refresh. A small bridge (src/mcp_oauth.py) connects the SDK's blocking callback to the existing web callback route via an asyncio.Future keyed by the OAuth `state`, and the dynamic client registration plus tokens persist per-server in a new encrypted `oauth_tokens` column. The connect runs as a bounded background task so the "Add server" request returns immediately; redirect_handler publishes needs_auth + auth_url to connection state as soon as discovery/DCR completes (which can exceed the bounded wait), and the UI polls until connected. Remote users finish via the existing paste-back flow. The Google OAuth path is left unchanged. - core/database.py: encrypted oauth_tokens column + migration - src/mcp_oauth.py: OAuth provider, DB-backed TokenStorage, state registry - src/mcp_manager.py: http dispatch, background connect, _connect_http - routes/mcp_routes.py: http validation, needs_auth/auth_url, callback bridge - static/js/settings.js: Streamable HTTP option + OAuth flow with polling - tests: 5 new unit tests (transport dispatch, registry, token storage) Verified against the live Higgsfield server: discovery, DCR (client_id issued), loopback redirect accepted, and a PKCE authorization URL with needs_auth status. No regressions (full suite delta is only the 5 added passing tests). * fix(mcp): address PR #1033 review feedback - mcp_oauth: derive redirect URI from OAUTH_REDIRECT_BASE_URL/APP_PUBLIC_URL (default http://localhost:7000) instead of hardcoding the port - mcp_oauth: leave OAuth scope unset so the SDK derives it from the server's WWW-Authenticate/protected-resource metadata; hardcoding an OIDC scope broke non-OpenID MCP servers (verified: Higgsfield still gets its server-derived scope) - mcp_oauth: prune abandoned OAuth flows (_prune_stale + _pending_ts) so the module-level registries can't grow unbounded - mcp_oauth: persist tokens/client-info in a single DB session/commit (_update) instead of a load+save double round-trip - mcp_manager: cancel and drop the background connect task in disconnect_server so a deleted server stops publishing status - database: document why the oauth_tokens migration uses TEXT while the model declares EncryptedText (encryption is applied at the Python layer) - settings.js: surface persistent OAuth-poll failures and an explicit timeout message instead of silently swallowing errors - tests: cover the stale-flow pruning * static/js/settings.js now shows an in-flight loading state on the buttons that fire requests:
2026-06-05 05:40:52 +05:00
# Cancel any in-flight HTTP/OAuth background connect so it stops
# publishing status for a server that may be getting deleted.
task = self._connect_tasks.pop(server_id, None)
if task is not None and not task.done():
task.cancel()
try:
from src.mcp_oauth import clear_auth_url
clear_auth_url(server_id)
except Exception:
pass
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stack = self._stacks.pop(server_id, None)
if stack:
try:
await stack.aclose()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Error closing MCP server {server_id}: {e}")
self._sessions.pop(server_id, None)
self._tools.pop(server_id, None)
self._connections.pop(server_id, None)
self._generation += 1
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logger.info(f"MCP server disconnected: {server_id}")
async def disconnect_all(self):
"""Disconnect from all MCP servers."""
ids = list(self._sessions.keys())
for sid in ids:
await self.disconnect_server(sid)
async def connect_all_enabled(self):
"""Connect to all enabled MCP servers from the database."""
from src.database import McpServer, SessionLocal
db = SessionLocal()
try:
servers = db.query(McpServer).filter(McpServer.is_enabled == True).all()
for srv in servers:
args = json.loads(srv.args) if srv.args else []
env = json.loads(srv.env) if srv.env else {}
await self.connect_server(
server_id=srv.id,
name=srv.name,
transport=srv.transport,
command=srv.command,
args=args,
env=env,
url=srv.url,
)
finally:
db.close()
async def call_tool(self, qualified_name: str, arguments: Dict) -> Dict:
"""Call an MCP tool by its qualified name (mcp__{server_id}__{tool_name}).
Returns a result dict compatible with agent_tools format.
"""
parts = qualified_name.split("__", 2)
if len(parts) != 3 or parts[0] != "mcp":
return {"error": f"Invalid MCP tool name: {qualified_name}", "exit_code": 1}
server_id = parts[1]
tool_name = parts[2]
session = self._sessions.get(server_id)
if not session:
return {"error": f"MCP server not connected: {server_id}", "exit_code": 1}
try:
result = await self._do_call(session, tool_name, arguments)
except Exception as e:
# Auto-reconnect for builtin servers whose subprocess may have died
if self.is_builtin(server_id):
logger.warning(f"MCP call failed for {qualified_name}, attempting reconnect: {e}")
reconnected = await self._reconnect_builtin(server_id)
if reconnected:
session = self._sessions.get(server_id)
if session:
try:
result = await self._do_call(session, tool_name, arguments)
except Exception as e2:
logger.error(f"MCP tool call failed after reconnect: {qualified_name}: {e2}")
return {"error": str(e2), "exit_code": 1}
else:
return {"error": f"Reconnected but no session for {server_id}", "exit_code": 1}
else:
logger.error(f"MCP reconnect failed for {server_id}")
return {"error": f"MCP server crashed and reconnect failed: {server_id}", "exit_code": 1}
else:
logger.error(f"MCP tool call failed: {qualified_name}: {e}")
return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}
return result
async def _do_call(self, session, tool_name: str, arguments: Dict) -> Dict:
"""Execute a single MCP tool call and return result dict."""
result = await session.call_tool(tool_name, arguments)
output_parts = []
images = []
for content in result.content:
if hasattr(content, 'text'):
output_parts.append(content.text)
elif getattr(content, 'type', '') == 'image' and hasattr(content, 'data'):
# Image content (e.g. Playwright screenshots)
mime = getattr(content, 'mimeType', 'image/png')
images.append({"data": content.data, "mimeType": mime})
output_parts.append(f"[Screenshot captured ({mime})]")
elif hasattr(content, 'data'):
output_parts.append(str(content.data))
output = "\n".join(output_parts)
is_error = getattr(result, 'isError', False)
result_dict = {
"stdout": output if not is_error else "",
"stderr": output if is_error else "",
"exit_code": 1 if is_error else 0,
}
if images:
result_dict["images"] = images
return result_dict
async def _reconnect_builtin(self, server_id: str) -> bool:
"""Tear down and reconnect a crashed builtin MCP server."""
import sys
from src.builtin_mcp import _BUILTIN_SERVERS
if server_id not in _BUILTIN_SERVERS:
return False
script_rel, name = _BUILTIN_SERVERS[server_id]
base_dir = get_app_root()
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script_path = os.path.join(base_dir, script_rel)
# Clean up old connection
await self.disconnect_server(server_id)
try:
ok = await self.connect_server(
server_id=server_id,
name=name,
transport="stdio",
command=sys.executable,
args=[script_path],
env={"PYTHONPATH": base_dir},
)
if ok:
logger.info(f"Reconnected builtin MCP server: {name}")
return ok
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to reconnect builtin MCP server {name}: {e}")
return False
def get_all_openai_schemas(self, disabled_map: Optional[Dict[str, set]] = None) -> List[Dict]:
"""Return all MCP tools in OpenAI function-calling format.
Tool names are namespaced as mcp__{server_id}__{tool_name}.
disabled_map: optional {server_id: set_of_disabled_tool_names} to filter out.
"""
schemas = []
for server_id, tools in self._tools.items():
# Skip builtin Python servers — they use the code-block tool format
# But include NPX-based builtins (like browser) which need function calling
if self.is_builtin(server_id) and server_id != "builtin_browser":
continue
conn = self._connections.get(server_id, {})
server_name = conn.get("name", server_id)
disabled = (disabled_map or {}).get(server_id, set())
identity = conn.get("identity", "")
label = f"{server_name} ({identity})" if identity else server_name
for tool in tools:
if tool["name"] in disabled:
continue
qualified = f"mcp__{server_id}__{tool['name']}"
schema = {
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": qualified,
"description": f"[MCP:{label}] {tool['description']}",
"parameters": tool.get("input_schema", {"type": "object", "properties": {}}),
},
}
schemas.append(schema)
return schemas
def get_all_tools(self, disabled_map: Optional[Dict[str, set]] = None) -> List[Dict]:
"""Return a flat list of all discovered tools with server info."""
result = []
for server_id, tools in self._tools.items():
conn = self._connections.get(server_id, {})
disabled = (disabled_map or {}).get(server_id, set())
for tool in tools:
result.append({
"server_id": server_id,
"server_name": conn.get("name", server_id),
"name": tool["name"],
"qualified_name": f"mcp__{server_id}__{tool['name']}",
"description": tool.get("description", ""),
"input_schema": tool.get("input_schema") or {},
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"is_disabled": tool["name"] in disabled,
})
return result
feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent (#638) * feat: Add plan mode to the chat agent Adds a plan mode: the agent investigates read-only, proposes a checklist, and waits for approval before changing anything. On approval it runs with full tools and checks items off as it goes. Enforcement reuses the existing disabled_tools gate. Includes a slash command: `/plan [on|off]` (and `/toggle plan`) to flip the plan toggle from the chat input. - src/tool_security.py, src/mcp_manager.py: read-only allowlist (tools + MCP). - src/agent_loop.py, routes/chat_routes.py: union the disabled set, prepend the plan directive, force agent mode. - static/: plan toggle pill, Approve & Run, dockable plan window, task-list checkboxes, and the /plan slash command. - tests/test_plan_mode.py. * Plan mode: persistent re-referenceable plan + agent write-back Three improvements so a long plan survives a weak model and stays in reach: 1. Re-reference the plan (out-of-context fix). On the execution turn the frontend sends the approved checklist back (`approved_plan`); the backend pins it as a top-of-context `## ACTIVE PLAN` system note (kept by the context trimmer), so the agent can always re-read the plan instead of losing the thread on a long run. New `build_active_plan_note()` (unit-tested). 2. Re-open / dock the plan anytime. The plan checklist is stored per-session (localStorage). When a plan exists, the plan-mode button opens a small menu ("Show plan" / "Plan mode: On/Off") that re-opens the side-dockable plan window — so it can stay docked while the agent works. The window live-refreshes as the plan changes. 3. Agent write-back: new `update_plan` tool. The agent calls it to tick steps `- [x]` after finishing them, or to revise steps when the user asks. Marker tool (no I/O) → `plan_update` SSE event → the stored plan + docked window update live. The ACTIVE PLAN note instructs the agent to use it. Backend: src/agent_loop.py (param + pin + note builder + emit + prompt blurb), src/tool_execution.py (update_plan handler), routes/chat_routes.py (parse `approved_plan`, relay `plan_update`), registration in tool_schemas / agent_tools / tool_index (always-available, not admin-gated). Frontend: static/js/chat.js (plan store, send `approved_plan`, handle `plan_update`, capture restated checklists), static/app.js (plan-button menu), static/js/planWindow.js (`isPlanWindowOpen`), static/js/storage.js (PLAN key). Tests: tests/test_plan_mode.py (plan-note), tests/test_update_plan_tool.py. * Plan mode: drop bash/python, rely on read-only discovery tools Shell can mutate (write files, hit the network) and can't be constrained to read-only at the tool layer, so plan mode no longer relies on a prompt to keep it well-behaved — bash/python are removed from the read-only allowlist and added to the fail-closed block set. Discovery is covered by the dedicated read-only tools (read_file, grep, glob, ls) instead. Rewrites the plan-mode directive to state shell is disabled and lists the available read-only tools positively. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Comment: note _MCP_READONLY_VERBS are prefixes not whole words Clarifies that entries like "summar" are intentional stems matched via startswith (covers summarise/summarize/summary), not typos. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: clarify why gating inverts the allowlist into a denylist Rename _PLAN_MODE_FALLBACK_BLOCK -> _PLAN_MODE_KNOWN_MUTATORS and rewrite the comments. The tool gate is a denylist (disabled_tools); plan mode's policy is an allowlist, so it returns the inverse (all known tool names minus the allowlist). The static mutator set is a backstop for the schema-derived name list, which misses XML-only tools and can fail to import. Addresses review feedback on #638. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Plan mode: stop hardcoding the read-only tool list in the directive The model is already shown its available (read-only) tools by _assemble_prompt, which removes every disabled tool. Enumerating them again in the directive only duplicated that list and would drift as tools change. Point at the tools listed below instead. Addresses review feedback on #638.
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def plan_mode_blocked_mcp(self) -> Tuple[Dict[str, Set[str]], Set[str]]:
"""Plan mode: block every MCP tool that isn't clearly read-only.
Returns (disabled_map, qualified_names):
- disabled_map: {server_id: {tool_name, ...}} to hide write tools from
the prompt/schemas (merged into the existing mcp_disabled_map).
- qualified_names: {"mcp__<server>__<tool>", ...} for runtime rejection
in execute_tool_block (which matches the qualified name).
"""
disabled_map: Dict[str, Set[str]] = {}
qualified: Set[str] = set()
for server_id, tools in self._tools.items():
for tool in tools:
if not mcp_tool_is_readonly(tool):
disabled_map.setdefault(server_id, set()).add(tool["name"])
qualified.add(f"mcp__{server_id}__{tool['name']}")
return disabled_map, qualified
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def is_builtin(self, server_id: str) -> bool:
"""Check if a server is a built-in (auto-registered) server."""
return server_id.startswith("builtin_") or server_id in {
"image_gen",
"memory",
"rag",
"email",
}
def get_server_status(self, server_id: str) -> Dict:
"""Get connection status for a server."""
return self._connections.get(server_id, {"status": "disconnected"})
def get_all_statuses(self) -> Dict[str, Dict]:
"""Get connection statuses for all servers."""
return dict(self._connections)
_cached_prompt_desc = None
_cached_prompt_desc_key = None
def get_tool_descriptions_for_prompt(self, disabled_map: Optional[Dict[str, set]] = None) -> str:
"""Generate text describing MCP tools for the agent system prompt. Cached."""
cache_key = (
frozenset((k, frozenset(v)) for k, v in (disabled_map or {}).items()),
len(self._tools),
self._generation,
)
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if self._cached_prompt_desc is not None and self._cached_prompt_desc_key == cache_key:
return self._cached_prompt_desc
tools = self.get_all_tools(disabled_map)
if not tools:
return ""
lines = ["\n\nYou also have access to external MCP tool servers. These tools are called via native function calling:"]
by_server = {}
for t in tools:
# Skip builtin Python servers — they're already in the agent prompt
# But include NPX-based builtins (like browser) which aren't hardcoded
if self.is_builtin(t["server_id"]) and t["server_id"] != "builtin_browser":
continue
if t.get("is_disabled"):
continue
sn = t["server_name"]
if sn not in by_server:
by_server[sn] = []
by_server[sn].append(t)
if not by_server:
return ""
for server_name, server_tools in by_server.items():
# Include identity (e.g. email address) if available
sid = server_tools[0]["server_id"] if server_tools else ""
identity = self._connections.get(sid, {}).get("identity", "")
label = f"{server_name} ({identity})" if identity else server_name
lines.append(f"\n**{label}:**")
for t in server_tools:
# Truncate long descriptions
desc = t['description'][:120] + '...' if len(t['description']) > 120 else t['description']
# Include the tool's declared inputs so the model calls it with
# real argument names instead of guessing from the description
# alone (issue #2509).
args_hint = _format_mcp_params(t.get("input_schema"))
lines.append(f" - {t['qualified_name']}: {desc}{args_hint}")
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result = "\n".join(lines)
self._cached_prompt_desc = result
self._cached_prompt_desc_key = cache_key
return result